This paper analyzes differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences between East and West Germany. As expected, there are substantial differences with respect to all three of these measures. Surprisingly, however, differences in distributional norms are much smaller than differences with respect to inequality perceptions or redistributive preferences. Moreover, individuals from East Germany tend to be more supportive of state redistribution and progressive taxation and they are less likely to have a conservative political orientation. I finally show that a substantial part of these differences in political preferences can be explained by underlying differences in redistributive preferences.
INTRODUCTION
It is well documented that individuals from different countries distinguish themselves markedly in their support for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Osberg and Smeeding, 2006) , but the roots of these differences are not yet fully understood. One especially interesting and important issue is whether institutions that favor redistribution, once established, have any feedback effect on individuals' distributional norms or their preferences for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . It is mainly against this background that the event of the German reunification has attracted considerable academic attention, since it provides an unique opportunity to shed light on the role that different political and economic institutions play in shaping individuals' preferences. Assuming that the separation of Germany after the Second World War was orthogonal to such preferences, as argued by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) , then the comparison between East and West Germany is informative about the feedback from institutions on individuals' redistributive preferences.
Not surprisingly, several empirical studies show that there are substantial differences in redistributive preferences, as well as in preferences over other goods, between East and West Germany. First, with respect to the demand for redistribution, both Corneo (2004) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that life satisfaction, both Frijters et al. (2004a Frijters et al. ( , 2004b and Easterlin and Plagnol (2008) find that the gap between East and West Germany substantially narrowed over time (since reunification), but did not completely vanish. In fact, life satisfaction among East Germans is still substantially lower today than among West Germans.
This paper adds to this small but growing literature on East-West-German differences in attitudes and preferences on mainly two dimensions. First, it uses a set of unique empirical measures which incorporates the conceptual distinction between the perceived and the ethically tolerated level of inequality (e.g. Sen, 2000) that allows me to add some new insights to the existing empirical evidence. For example, (the speed of) convergence in redistributive preferences between East and West Germany likely depends on whether individuals differ more in their inequality perceptions or their distributional beliefs (because, e.g., perceptions may change faster than norms). In fact, the key result emanating from my empirical analysis is that individuals from East and West Germany differ much less in their evaluation of how the ethical distribution of wages should look like than in their perceptions of existing wage differentials. This finding likely reflects that there have been substantial changes especially to the East German wage structure since reunification. 1 Second, the analysis also shows that there are large differences in individuals' more general political preferences between East and West Germans, such as their propensity to support progressive taxation, and that differences in inequality perceptions and distributional norms explain a substantial part of the raw differences in political preferences. Specifically, East Germans are much more likely to believe that it is the government's responsibility to reduce inequalities that are perceived as being too large. Thus while there are only small differences in distributional norms regarding ethically acceptable pay differentials across people working in different occupations between East and West Germany, and while differences in redistributive preferences are therefore mainly driven by differences in inequality perceptions, it is nonetheless true that East Germans are much more likely than West Germans to think that it is the state's responsibility to reduce existing inequalities. Interestingly, it thus appears that communism shaped individuals' perception of the role of the state regarding wage inequality judged to be unethical, but did not substantially affect individuals' beliefs of what they view as an ethical or legitimate distribution of wages across different occupations.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the data source and the key measures that I will focus on in the empirical analysis. East-West-German differences in subjective inequality measures and redistributive preferences are presented and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents evidence on the relation between these measures and individuals' more general political preferences. Section 5 concludes.
1. Empirical studies show that wage inequality, as well as inequality of market income, has increased substantially in East Germany since reunification (e.g. Bach et al.2009; Biewen, 2000; Franz and Steiner, 2000) . Moreover, Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) show that there were similar trends of increasing inequality in both disposable household income and consumption. It is also true, however, that massive public transfers reduced the income gap between East and West Germany that would have prevailed otherwise (Schwarze, 1996) .
DATA AND MEASURES
I use data from three consecutive surveys of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) which all focus closely on issues of social inequality. The three surveys were administered in 1987 in , 1992 in , and 1999 for East Germany are only available from 1992 onwards. All three surveys contain an interesting series of questions on respondents' subjective estimates of both actual and ethical gross earnings for people working in different occupations (such as a shop assistant, a lawyer, the chairman of a large national corporation, or a judge in the constitutional court). These estimates reflect differentials in market wages (i.e. wages before taxes and transfers) across different occupations that respondents perceive to exist and that they view as legitimate, respectively. Using these individual estimates of actual and ethical market wages, it is possible to construct two different subjective inequality indices and to derive a measure of redistributive preferences therefrom (see Kuhn, 2011, for details) . More specifically, it is possible to construct two distinct subjective Gini coefficients analogous to the conventional Gini coefficient used to describe objective inequality. 2 The first of these two subjective Gini coefficients, GðiÞ actual , describes individuals' perceptions of the actual level of wage inequality, while the second, GðiÞ ethical , refers to people's ethical level of inequality and thus reflects an individual's distributional norms. Note that there is variation in these two inequality indices across individuals, in contrast to objective measures of inequality, as long as individuals have different perceptions of actual wages and/or different evaluations of ethical wages (it turns out that people do have widely different inequality perceptions and normative beliefs). The third measure used in the analysis is simply the relative difference between the two inequality indices, RðiÞ ¼ 1 À ðGðiÞ ethical =GðiÞ actual Þ. This measure describes individuals' demand for equalization of market wages, i.e. R(i) equals 0 if and only if the perceived level of wage inequality is exactly the same as the evaluation of ethical wage inequality. Alternatively, one may also think of R(i) as measuring the absence of market justice because higher values of R(i) imply a larger discrepancy between an individual's ethical and actual level of inequality of market wages. Thus R(i) = 0 indicates that an individual perceives the market distribution of wage to be perfectly just, in the sense that there is no discrepancy between his or her perception of the distribution of market wages and his or her desired distribution of market wages. Table 1 presents some basic descriptives for these three measures in the overall sample. Note that the perceived level of wage inequality is considerably larger than the ethical level of wage inequality (0.439 vs. 0.288, on average). Consequently, the demand for (at least some) equalization of market wages is strictly 2. As in the case of objective wage data a subjective Gini coefficient of 0 denotes absolute equality, while a coefficient of 1 denotes the maximum level of inequality. In my application, a coefficient of 0 would imply that wage estimates by the individual under consideration are equal for all occupations. A coefficient of 1 is very unlikely to be observed, but a coefficient close to 1 is clearly possible and would imply that an individual estimates the earnings of one occupation to be way higher than the earnings in all other occupations. positive on average (with a mean value of 0.338), which means that individuals would like to see less spread in market wages than what they perceive to actually exist (92.2% of all individuals have a strictly positive demand for equalization of market wages).
SUBJECTIVE INEQUALITY INDICES AND REDISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCES

East-West differences
To elaborate on the differences in subjective inequality measures between East and West Germans, I run a series of regression models that take the following basic form:
with y it denoting either one of the two subjective inequality indices (i.e. either inequality perceptions or distributional norms) or redistributive preferences of individual i in year t. 3 The regressor of main interest is East it , a dummy variable denoting current residency in East Germany. 4 The regressions also include a Notes: All numbers refer to the data pooled across all three survey years (1987, 1992, 1999) . 1(Á) denotes the indicator function.
3. These regressions include observations from the 1987 survey (West Germany only) as well. 4. Unfortunately, the ISSP only records current residency, but not place of birth, and selective migration from one to the other part of Germany (mainly from East to West) is thus a potential concern [according to Hunt (2006) , as much as 9% of the East German population (as of 1989) emigrated to the West until 1999]. However, some plausible sample permutations (i.e. reallocating some observations from the West-to the East-German subsample) yield estimates that are not statistically different from those that do not control for East-West migration. See also Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) on the issue of internal migration before 1989. number of control variables and survey-year fixed effects, denoted by x it and k t , respectively. 5 Moreover, for each of the three outcomes, I show both the raw difference between East and West Germans as well as the remaining difference once I include the full set of control variables. The table also shows the estimated survey-year fixed effects, which quantify any distributional shifts between the different survey years. Finally, I also include interaction terms between the dummy for Eastern Germany and the dummies for the year of the survey. This specification allows for the possibility that the difference between East and West Germany in the considered outcome varies over time. Table 2 shows the resulting parameter estimates. The first three columns show results for individuals' inequality perceptions. The first column shows that the raw difference in inequality perceptions between East and West Germans equals about 0.07 Gini points. In relative terms, inequality perception is thus about 16% higher in East than in West Germany. The inclusion of additional control variables has only a marginal impact on the corresponding parameter estimate, as shown in the second column. There remains a large and significant difference of 0.067 Gini points after including the full set of control variables remains (in relative terms, the remaining difference still equals about 15%). These estimates show that there are significant time effects as well. 6 The third column additionally includes the interaction terms between the East German dummy and the dummies indicating year of survey. Estimates from this model show that the difference in inequality perceptions between East and West Germany narrowed considerably over time, from 0.082 Gini points in 1992 to only 0.036 Gini points in 1999.
The next three columns show results for the ethical level of wage inequality (i.e. distributional norms). Surprisingly, and in contrast to inequality perceptions, the ethical level of wage inequality is somewhat higher among East Germans, i.e. it appears that East Germans are slightly more tolerant towards wage inequality than West Germans. 7 The resulting point estimate for the East dummy is 0.014 in both the specification without and with additional control variables. Thus there is a much smaller, though still statistically significant, difference in social norms than in inequality perceptions between East and West Germany. 8 The regression estimates also show that distributional norms changed even more over time than inequality perceptions. Most notably, the increase in the ethical level of wage inequality between 1992 and 1999 is about three times as large as the corresponding increase from 1987 to 1992. The third model again includes 5. The full list of control variables is as follows: Personal income (rank), social mobility index, the perception that ascribed (acquired) characteristics are important in determining one's pay, the belief that needs (effort) should be important in determining one's pay, the perception of conflicts in society, a cubic in age, education (in years), a female dummy, labor market status (three categories), and occupation (ten categories). 6. Note that there are no observations for East Germany for the year 1987. The estimated effect on the dummy for the year 1992 thus only refers to changes in West Germany, while the estimated effect on the dummy for the year 1999 refers to changes for both East and West Germany. 7. In line with this finding, East Germans are somewhat more likely to think that 'working hard'
and 'doing one's job well' should be important in determining pay. 8. This holds true if one takes into account that the mean ethical inequality is considerably smaller than the average perceived inequality. interaction terms between survey-year and the dummy for East Germany. The corresponding estimates show that the difference in the ethical level of wage inequality between East and West Germany switched from positive in 1992 (â ¼ 0:031) to negative in 1999 (â ¼ À 0:022). The last three columns finally show analogous results for individuals' redistributive preferences. There is again a large and statistically significant raw difference between East and West Germans. In this case, however, the inclusion of individual level controls appears to have some influence on the estimated difference between East and West Germany. The raw difference of 0.059 shrinks to 0.052 if the full set of control variables is included in the regression. Overall, this finding is in line with previous evidence showing that East Germans have a higher demand for equalization of market wages than West Germans. Furthermore, while there is virtually no change in average redistributive preferences from 1987 to 1992, there is a substantial and significant decrease from 1992 to 1999 (cf. footnote 6 ). The above results make it clear that this finding is the consequence of a disproportional increase in the ethical level of wage inequality because inequality perceptions had increased as well within this period. The final column shows that the difference in the demand for equalization of market wages between East and West Germany increased considerably over time, from 0.037 in 1992 to 0.083 in 1999, reflecting the different underlying time trends in inequality perceptions and distributional norms, respectively.
East-West differences across birth cohorts
Another important issue is whether there is convergence in redistributive preferences over time between the two regions, either because individuals change their preferences as they age or because of cohort effects. A first look at this issue is provided by Figure 1 , which shows differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences by birth cohort (for all individuals born in 1910 or later because; because there are too few observations from individuals born before 1910, they are left out of the analysis).
First, panel (a) of Figure 1 shows how inequality perceptions differ between East and West Germans and across year of birth. There is clearly a substantial difference in inequality perception between East and West Germans for every birth cohort. The difference appears to be of the same size for most cohorts, but there is a slight trend towards smaller differences for younger cohorts as well. Panel (b) again shows the surprising result that East Germans tend to have a higher level of ethical inequality than West Germans, and that differences in distributional norms tend to be considerably smaller than corresponding differences in inequality perceptions. The difference in distributional norms varies somewhat across birth cohorts, and is largest among the oldest and youngest cohorts and smallest for the cohorts born between about 1935 and 1960. Finally, panel (c) shows that differences in redistributive preferences are again larger for older cohorts, reflecting the underlying difference in both inequality perceptions and distributional norms. Driven mainly by underlying differences in inequality perceptions, there is a positive difference in redistributive preferences between East and West Germans for every birth cohort, but the difference appears to narrow for younger cohorts (similar to the pattern that is observed for inequality perceptions).
A. Kuhn
Appropriately specified regression models can quantify these cohort patterns in a more precise way. Specifically, for each of the three subjective inequality measures, I run a regression model that takes the following basic form:
with Cohort it representing a series of indicator functions for year of birth in intervals of five consecutive years. 9 Also note that the list of control variables is slightly different from above as I do not include individuals' age (note that year of survey and year of birth determine an individual's age in the year of the survey). Table 3 shows estimates of parameter vector a, which describes East-West difference by birth cohort. For comparison, I also show estimates of a from equation (1) but for the same subsample of individuals (i.e. excluding individuals born before 1910). In the case of inequality perceptions, the pattern of estimated [1910,…,1914] , the second denotes year of birth in the interval [1915,…,1919] , and so on. Note that, when estimating equation (2), one of these indicator functions has to be dropped from the list of regressors to identify the overall constant term, given by b 0 . East-West differences by birth cohorts is consistent with what is already evident from Figure 1 . There are large differences in inequality perceptions between individuals from East and West Germany, and these differences all turn out to be statistically different from zero. Moreover, the difference in inequality perceptions tends to be larger for older cohorts. The estimates of cohort-specific differences look different in the case of distributional norms. Many coefficients turn out to be small and, in fact, only three are statistically different from zero. Also, the F-test on the joint null hypothesis that all cohort differences are simultaneously equal to zero yields a p-value above the 10% level (p = 0.146). This confirms the former finding that East-West differences in distributional norms are much less pronounced than differences in inequality perceptions. Finally, East-West differences in redistributive preferences turn out to be positive for each group of birth cohorts (not all coefficients are statistically different from zero, however), and they tend to become smaller for younger cohorts as well.
Overall, I find that there are substantial East-West differences in inequality perceptions across all birth cohorts, but also that differences in inequality perceptions are smaller for younger birth cohorts. A much more remarkable finding, however, is that there are almost no differences in distributional norms for any of the birth cohorts considered in the analysis, except perhaps for the youngest cohorts (for these cohorts, however, the ethical level of wage inequality is even slightly higher among East Germans). As a consequence, differences in redistributive preferences are indeed somewhat smaller among younger birth cohorts. This result is in line with the finding of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) that there is rather rapid convergence in redistributive preferences between East and West Germans.
POLITICAL PREFERENCES
I next study how subjective inequality indices and redistributive preferences, respectively, are associated with individuals' political preferences, such as their support for intervention by the state regarding wage differentials that are viewed as illegitimate. In the following, I will treat individuals' inequality perceptions and their distributional norms, as well as their redistributive preferences, as if they were predetermined. This simply implies that I will use them as explanatory variables when modeling individuals' political preferences. 10 Specifically, I estimate the parameters of a regression model that takes the following form: 11
10. Obviously, one could argue for the opposite case as well, i.e. that political preferences are predetermined and influence, say, individuals' distributional norms. While I believe that both views have their merits, and that causality likely runs in both directions, I focus on modeling political preferences as a function of inequality perceptions and distributional norms in this paper. 11. I focus on simple differences in political preferences between East and West Germany, neglecting differences across cohorts. Results hardly change, however, if the East dummy is interacted with dummies for year of birth. I thus only discuss the results that do not include these interaction terms in the main text.
where x it describes the political preferences of individual i in year t. Individuals' political preferences are measured by the following three variables: their support for redistribution by the state, their support for progressive taxation, and their identification with conservative politics (more information on these measures is given below). The key regressor in all three cases is y it , which denotes the inclusion of either individuals' redistributive preferences or, alternatively, the two subjective inequality indices (i.e. both subjective inequality indices at the same time). I also show results excluding y it to illustrate the quantitative impact of y it on the estimated size of parameter a. Estimates of both a and c are shown in Table 4 . The first three columns of Table 4 show results for individuals' support for redistribution by the state. 12 The difference between East and West Germans is large and statistically significant in all three specifications. The resulting point estimate in the first specification is 0.587 (with a small standard error of 0.034). This implies a relative difference of about 16% between East and West Germans in their general support for redistribution by the state. The next two specifications show that the inclusion of y it as a control variable has a substantial impact on this difference. First, including redistributive preferences as control variable decreases the estimated difference between East and West Germany to 0.537, which still is a large and significant difference. The third column includes the two subjective inequality indices (instead of redistributive preferences). This decreases the remaining difference even more, to 0.505. Redistributive preferences can thus explain about 8.5%( = 100%[1À(0.537/0.587)]), while inequality perceptions and distributional norms can explain about 14%( = 100%[1À(0.505/ 0.587)]) of the remaining difference in the support for redistribution by the state. However, even in the last specification, the difference between East and West Germans remains both statistically and quantitatively significant (the difference is equal to about half a standard deviation of the dependent variable).
The next three columns show estimates for individuals' support for progressive taxation, similar to the questions on marginal tax rates used in Rainer and Siedler (2009). 13 As in the case of people's general support for redistribution by the state, there is a substantial difference between East and West Germans. Even though this difference shrinks once controls for redistributive preferences or inequality perceptions and distributional norms are included, a significant and large (equal to about one fifth of a standard deviation of the dependent variable) difference in individuals' support for progressive taxation with the same distributional preferences remains. As before, redistributive preferences as well as inequality perceptions and distributional norms explain a substantial fraction of the observed East-West difference in the support for progressive taxation that 12. This variable measures individuals' agreement with the following statement: "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes." The corresponding variable ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 (1) denoting perfect agreement (disagreement) with the statement. 13. The variable measures individuals' response to the following question: "Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?" The corresponding variable takes on values from 1 to 5, with 1 (5) meaning that respondents think that the share of people with higher incomes should be much smaller (much larger) than the share of people with low incomes. remains after conditioning on the full set of controls (about 13% and 27%, respectively). Also note that the estimated difference in the support for progressive taxation is smaller, in relative terms, than the corresponding difference in the support for redistribution by the state. The remaining three columns of Table 4 report results for individuals' political orientation on a simple left-right scale, with higher values indicating a more conservative orientation. 14 East Germans are much less likely to state that they have a conservative (rightist) political orientation than West Germans. Again, this difference remains large and significant even if redistributive preferences or subjective inequality indices are explicitly held constant. The remaining difference equals about one third of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. The results imply that the fraction of the East-West difference in individuals' political orientation that can be explained by differences in redistributive preferences or inequality perceptions and distributional norms is about 8% and 9%, respectively.
DISCUSSION
The focus of this paper is on differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences between East and West Germany. Not surprisingly, a first finding is that East Germans demand more redistribution than West Germansa finding that is in line with previous evidence (e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007) . However, I also find that mainly differences in inequality perceptions, rather than differences in distributional norms, are responsible for this difference in redistributive preferences. The fact that I find only small differences in distributional norms between East and West Germany is somewhat surprising at first sight. At the same time, however, it seems plausible that it reflects the fact that the two Germanies share a common culture and history until their separation after the Second World War. In fact, the finding is also consistent with results reported in an earlier study by Shiller et al. (1991) , who found similar attitudes towards income inequality between American and Soviet respondents shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the fact that East Germans perceive a much higher level of wage inequality than West Germans likely reflects underlying trends in wage inequality following German reunification in the two parts of the country (i.e. increasing wage inequality in East Germany).
I also find substantial differences in individuals' more general political preferences, especially people's attitudes towards intervention by the state as a means of reducing existing wage inequalities. Specifically, East Germans are much more likely than West Germans to support state intervention with respect to the distribution of incomes and, consistent with this finding, they are also much more likely to support higher taxes for individuals with higher income. Finally, East Germans are substantially less likely to state that they have a conservative political orientation (measured on a simple left-right scale). Interestingly, the differences in political orientation remain large and statistically significant once 14. The variable measures respondents' political orientation on a simple left-right scale running from 1 to 10. The lowest (highest) value denotes the leftmost (rightmost) position on the scale. redistributive preferences, or its two underlying components, are statistically held constant. Nonetheless, differences in inequality perceptions and distributional norms or redistributive preferences, respectively, explain a substantial fraction of the observed differences in political preferences. Taken together, the findings presented in this paper suggest that living under a socialist regime did not substantially influence individuals' fundamental distributional norms (i.e. their norms with respect to legitimate wage differentials for people working in different occupations). At the same time, however, it appears that it had a significant impact on people's belief that it is the state's responsibility to intervene if existing wage differentials are judged to be too large, and it presumably changed individuals' views on the role that the state should more generally play.
